Mortgages--Parol Evidence Admitted to Show Defective Acknowledgement of Ostensibly Valid Instrument by Douglas, Malcolm C.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4
1956
Mortgages--Parol Evidence Admitted to Show
Defective Acknowledgement of Ostensibly Valid
Instrument
Malcolm C. Douglas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Malcolm C. Douglas, Mortgages--Parol Evidence Admitted to Show Defective Acknowledgement of Ostensibly Valid Instrument, 7 W. Res. L.
Rev. 492 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol7/iss4/14
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
two constitutional provisions guaranteeing as a human right, the privilege
against self-incrimination.
The decision of the Ohio court in the instant case is legally sound,
logically correct and places the court in accord with the majority view.
Nonetheless the wisdom of the decision may be questioned. The decision
is essentially based upon the concept of separate and distinct sovereign-
ties. Once having presented this doctrine, the court moves mechanically to
its all too logical conclusion. The fiction appears to blind the court to the
practical significance of the decision. This is not meant to discredit,
generally, the doctrine of separate sovereigns for it is an essential element
of our system of law. However, the doctrine does not displace all other
reason. The decision of the Michigan Court, previously referred to, makes
no reference to the doctrine. The Ohio court did not discuss whether its
decision was in keeping with the spirit of the Ohio constitutional pro-
vision. No mention was made of the relative position of the privilege in
our modern state as compared with its historical signifance. If the court
feels that the privilege has become an instrument for the protection of
communists and criminals this should be revealed. Perhaps, above all else,
the court should have made mention of the fairness and justness of the de-
cision, not necessarily to this witness, but to future witnesses who may not
be involved in communist activites. When the court is dealing with human
rights secured by a constitutional provision, more than mere doctrinal
analysis may be reasonably expected.
DAvm P. FREED
MORTGAGES - PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITIED TO SHOW
DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF OSTENSIBLY VALID
INSTRUMENT
An action to marshal liens on certain real property owned by the de-
fendant was brought by the Citizen's National Bank, one of several mort-
gagees, against Denison, the mortgagor, and the other mortgagees. The
mortgages on Denison's property had been recorded in the following order:
(1) a mortgage in favor of the plaintiff bank; (2) the mortgage held by
the Citizen's Budget Company; (3) another mortgage in favor of the -bank,
given to refinance the earlier mortgage; and (4) a mortgage held by one
Graham. All of the above instruments were obtained without fraud; all
were properly recorded; and each, on its face, was valid. However, the
method employed in the acknowledgment of the Budget Company's mort-
S. Ct. 497 (1956). It should be noted here that though the Congress has the power
to prohibit subsequent state prosecutions by an immunity statute, there is no indica-
tion that this is necessary for an immunity statute to be held constitutional. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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gage was improper,' the mortgagor's husband having acknowledged his
signature and that of his wife over the telephone to the notary.2
In this case the court determined that parol evidence should have been
admitted to show that an ostensibly valid mortgage was improperly acknowl-
edged, thereby disentitling that instrument to record and making it invalid
against the liens of the bank and Graham, the holders of subsequent, prop-
erly recorded mortgages.
Ohio courts have consistently held that an improperly executed or
acknowledged instrument is not entitled to record and that if the instrument
is mistakenly admitted to record, it is to be treated as if it had not been
recorded. Prior to the instant case, however, this rule had been applied
only to those situations in which a defect appeared on the face of the
instrument.4 Some courts have said, by way of dictum, that if the mortgagee
knew or should have known of the falsity of the certificate of the attesting
officer, the instrument might be impeached by parol evidence.5 But in
a case involving the analogous problem of an improperly acknowledged
lease, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a second lessee who had "con-
structive notice" of a prior recorded lease and actual knowledge of an ir-
regularity in its acknowledgment could not have the earlier instrument
set aside for a failure to fulfill the statutory requirements for the acknowl-
edgment and attestation of leases."
In the instant case the courts conformed to well-established precedent in
holding that a defectively acknowledged instrument is not entitled to Tecord
and that if recorded it is not valid and does not afford constructive notice
of its existence.7 Therefore, it was held that a defective mortgage does not
establish a lien with priority over subsequent, properly recorded mort-
gages. However, the court then stepped beyond the scope of established
precedent in holding that this rule applies not only when the instrument is
2OHIO REv. CODE § 5301.01 requires that the signature of the mortgagee must be
acknowledged before an attesting officer who shall certify the acknowledgment and
subscribe his name to the certificate of such acknowledgment.
Catizen's National Bank v. Denison, 165 Ohio St. 89 (1956).
a27 Oio Jti., Mortgages § 89 (1933).
'Amick v. Woodworth, 58 Ohio St. 86, 50 N.E. 437 (1898); Strang v. Beach, 11
Ohio St. 283 (1860); Erwin v. Shuey, 8 Ohio St. 509 (1858); White v. Denman,
1 Ohio St. 110 (1853).
'Baldwin v. Snowden, 11 Ohio St. 203 (1860); 27 OHio Jun., Mortgages § 75
(1933).
'Logan Gas Co. v. Keith, 117 Ohio St. 206, 158 N.E. 184 (1927).
7 It is to be noted that the recording of mortgages is governed by the provisions of
OHIO REV. CODE § 5301.23, not by § 5301.25 as was stated in the Denison case.
The recording of mortgages has been governed by a separate statutory provision since
1831. However, this error does not seem to have been a determinative factor in the
court's decision.
1956")
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
invalid on its face, but also when the defective condition of the conveyance
can be shown by external evidence.
It is difficult to perceive any tenable reason in either logic or policy for
the court's holding. The court offered little by way of justification. It did
point to the fact that a legal obligation rests upon a notary to conform to the
statutory requirements for the acknowledgment of mortgages and other con-
veyances of interests in real property. But to deprive the Budget Company
of the priority of its lien over those established by the subsequent mort-
gages is an uncalled for punishment of the mortgagee for the failure of the
notary to adhere to the statutory requirements -for acknowledgment and
attestation. Had either of the other mortgagees been misled or defrauded
by the facts underlying the execution or acknowledgment of the instrument,
the result of this case would have been justified and well-grounded on
precedent.8 But one should note that ostensibly valid mortgages must be
admitted to record and -that the holders of subsequent mortgages are
charged with a duty to inspect the records and consequently with notice
of all contained therein. Therefore, both the bank and Graham knew
or should have known of the existence of the apparently valid mortgage.
As neither was prejudiced -by the error in its acknowledgment, there is no
justification for their being given this gratuity. The better rule would
seem to be that the certificate of an attesting officer should not be im-
peached in the absence of fraud or deception.
MALCOLm C. DOUGLAS
aWilliamson v. Carskadden, 36 Ohio St. 664 (1881).
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